A Brooklyn federal judge has ruled that first-degree murder under federal law does not qualify as a crime of violence for purposes of the federal firearm-enhancement statute. As a result, two firearm-related charges were dismissed in a terrorism case connected to a 2015 attack in Mali, while the underlying murder charge remains.
What The Judge Said
In a Feb. 6 memorandum, U.S. District Judge Brian Cogan held that first‑degree murder under 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a) is not a categorical “crime of violence” for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), according to CaseMine. Applying the categorical approach, which looks to statutory elements rather than the facts of any particular case, Cogan granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss Counts Two and Three, which charged brandishing or discharging a firearm and causing death by firearm tied to a § 924(c) predicate.
Cogan acknowledged the unusual nature of the inquiry but stated that controlling precedent and the strict categorical framework required his decision, even if it differs from common perceptions of what constitutes violent conduct.
Indictment And Extradition Background
Fawaz Ould Ahmed Ould Ahemeid was indicted in 2020 on six counts, including a first‑degree murder charge tied to the Nov. 20, 2015 Radisson Blu hotel attack in Bamako that killed U.S. citizen Anita Ashok Datar, according to a press release from the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Brooklyn. After being transferred to U.S. custody, he arrived at JFK in December 2022. The indictment also includes material‑support and explosives counts that remain pending while prosecutors sort out how to respond to the firearm ruling.
Why The Law Tripwires Prosecutors
The decision comes amid unsettled federal precedent over what exactly qualifies as a “crime of violence.” In Delligatti v. United States (March 21, 2025), the Supreme Court held that the knowing or intentional causation of injury or death, including in some situations by omission, can constitute the “use” of physical force referenced in § 924(c), according to Delligatti v. United States. At the same time, lower courts remain bound to apply the categorical approach that focuses on what the statute requires on its face, not how the defendant is alleged to have acted in a specific case.
Cogan noted that, despite higher-court guidance favoring a broader interpretation of use of force, the categorical approach can lead judges to conclusions that may seem counterintuitive, including determining that a federal murder statute does not automatically qualify as a crime of violence for § 924(c) purposes…