Additional Coverage:
- OceanGate Titan submersible damaged on multiple dives before catastrophic implosion, NTSB report finds (foxnews.com)
New Report Reveals Damaged Hull, Flawed Engineering Led to Tragic Titan Implosion
A comprehensive new report into the catastrophic implosion of the Titan submersible, which claimed the lives of five individuals, has unveiled critical findings: the vessel sustained damage during previous dives and was constructed through a faulty engineering process that failed to meet essential safety standards. These conditions, the report concludes, ultimately precipitated the fatal incident.
Released by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) on Wednesday, the report also highlighted that OceanGate, the operator of the submersible, neglected to adequately test the Titan or accurately assess its true strength and durability.
The ill-fated vessel imploded in 2023 near the Titanic wreck in the North Atlantic Ocean, resulting in the instantaneous deaths of all five occupants. Unlike earlier investigations, the NTSB’s report specifically details the physical failure of the Titan’s carbon-fiber hull and introduces new technical safety recommendations.
“We found that the Titan pressure vessel likely sustained damage after it surfaced at the end of dive 80 in the form of one or more delaminations, which weakened the pressure vessel,” the report states. Delamination, in simpler terms, refers to the separation of material layers within the carbon fiber hull.
These delaminations reportedly worsened between dive 80 and dive 88, the submersible’s final dive, culminating in a localized buckling failure that triggered the implosion. Furthermore, the report indicates that after dive 82, the Titan suffered additional damage of unknown origin, further compromising and weakening the pressure vessel.
The NTSB report asserts that OceanGate’s real-time monitoring of the Titan’s pressure data was flawed, leaving the company unaware of the vessel’s damage and the immediate need to remove it from service. The sensors designed to detect hull strain did not activate proper alarms, and engineers either misinterpreted or disregarded the data, according to the report.
The vessel’s flawed engineering and carbon fiber design were identified as the primary causes of its ultimate demise.
“We determined that the probable cause of the hull failure and implosion… was OceanGate’s inadequate engineering process, which failed to establish the actual strength and durability of the Titan pressure vessel and resulted in the company operating a carbon fiber composite vessel that sustained delamination damage… resulting in a damaged internal structure that subsequently led to a local buckling failure of the pressure vessel,” the report concludes.
The report also suggests that the wreckage of the Titan might have been located sooner had OceanGate adhered to standard emergency response protocols, which would have saved “time and resources even though a rescue was not possible in this case.”
This NTSB report follows a 335-page report issued by the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) in August, which also concluded that the tragedy was preventable, stemming from an experimental design and disregarded safety warnings.
That report placed significant blame on OceanGate, with particular culpability assigned to OceanGate CEO Stockton Rush, who perished in the disaster. It also scrutinized OceanGate’s company culture, leadership, certification gaps, and the suppression of safety concerns.
The new NTSB report provides more precise details that the Coast Guard report did not explicitly outline, such as the specific manner in which the Titan’s carbon-fiber pressure hull physically failed. For instance, while the Coast Guard report mentioned “cracking sounds” and “signs of fatigue” during earlier dives, it did not link them to a specific dive sequence or a confirmed chain of delamination.
The NTSB report calls for a Coast Guard-led panel of deep-submersible experts to study current pressure-vessel operations and share their findings with the industry, alongside the development of new U.S. regulations for pressure vessels intended for human occupancy. It further recommends that the Coast Guard implement regulations for these vehicles, informed by the findings of this study. The report explicitly states that existing regulations for small passenger vessels “enabled OceanGate’s operation of the Titan in an unsafe manner.”
Finally, the report urged the Coast Guard to “disseminate findings of the study to the industry,” which has experienced growth in recent years due to increased privately-financed exploration.